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REAL WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE BIG SQUEEZE 
 
Short Title: Real Wages and Unemployment* 
 
Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin and Mariña Fernández-Salgado 
 
UK real wage growth has slowed down, stagnated and recently turned sharply negative. We 
document the nature of real wage changes across the wage distribution over the last three decades, 
showing that recent patterns represent a distinct break of trend that pre-dates the onset of 
recession. We explore whether unemployment has become a stronger moderating influence on 
real wage growth and report, using aggregate economy-wide and regional panel data, that real 
wage-unemployment sensitivities have become stronger in the period from 2003 onwards. 
Finally, we offer some assessment of possible drivers of this increased sensitivity of real wages to 
unemployment. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the years following the financial crash and economic downturn of 2008-09, the UK labour 
market has responded differently to previous recent recessions. Output has remained below peak 
for much longer, with no sustained recovery apparent at least five years on from the start of the 
crisis. In contrast to the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s, real wages have fallen quite sharply 
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rather than simply levelling off for a short period as, relative to the magnitude of the economic 
contraction, unemployment has risen by less than expected.  
 While real wage trends are affected by a number of economic factors, these two (at first 
glance) surprising outcomes are likely to be connected. However painful falling wages may be for 
individual workers, it is important to note that they may have been instrumental in preventing a 
much larger increase in unemployment. At the same time, the relatively benign picture for 
employment coupled with stagnant output has, as discussed in detail by Pessoa and Van Reenen 
(2014), led to an extremely poor productivity performance. This said, the factors driving these 
unusual (in historical terms) trends remain unclear. Set against this backdrop, gaining a better 
understanding of the extent to which there has been a shift in the relationship between real wages 
and unemployment becomes an important research venture. It is also one that has implications for 
real wage growth during any future period of economic recovery.  
To show that this recent pattern of poor real wage performance is in stark contrast to what 
happened in the past, Figure 1 plots real wage growth at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the 
wage distribution between 1979 and 2012. The Figure shows a general picture of steady real wage 
growth in the UK labour market through the 1980s and 1990s. Though wage inequality rose 
rapidly in this period – driven by faster growth in wages at the top (90th percentile) as compared to 
the middle (50th percentile), and in turn faster growth at the middle compared to the bottom (10th 
percentile) this was (mostly) in the form of differential positive trends in real wage growth, and 
not through periods of real wage falls in any particular part of the distribution.1 Since then, 
however, real wages have stagnated and then fallen right across the wage distribution.  
With these developments in mind, this paper seeks to do two main things. First, we 
carefully document what has happened to real wage growth over time and describe how there has 
been different behaviour relative to the past. Second, we empirically model the way that 
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unemployment holds back real wages, asking whether there has been any change in the real wage-
unemployment relationship in the period of poor real wage performance that has recently 
characterised the UK labour market. To do so we look at changes over time at both the national 
and regional level.  
Our analysis highlights the recent period of stagnant and falling real wage growth just 
described that represents a distinct break of trend that started somewhere in the early 2000s and, 
importantly, which pre-dates the onset of recession. For example, since 2003 median real wages 
fell by around 1.4 per cent a year on average (flat-lining in the first part of this period and falling 
following the onset of recession).  
At the same time, we also find an increased sensitivity of real wages to unemployment in 
the period from 2003. The increased correlation between the two is strong: in our empirical 
analysis the (negative) real wage-unemployment elasticity rises by around 5 to 6 percent (for a 
doubling of the unemployment rate) in the period between 2003 and 2012 as compared to 1986 to 
2002.  More precisely, this shift means that for the increase in the unemployment rate that took 
place between its low in 2005 (4.7 per cent) and its peak in late-2011 (8.4 per cent) someone 
working full-time at the median rate of pay earned around £1040-1240 less in annual earnings (in 
2012 prices) compared to what would have occurred in earlier decades.2 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we first briefly document what 
has happened to real wages and to unemployment over time in the UK, before turning to consider 
the connection between real wages and unemployment and a discussion of the modelling 
approach we adopt. Section 3 describes the data we use. In Section 4, we focus in more detail on 
the nature of real wage changes in the move from the period of positive real wage growth to the 
period of flat or falling real wage growth. In Section 5, we report our empirical findings on the 
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changing sensitivity of real wages to unemployment and present a first exploration of possible 
explanations as to why such a shift has occurred. Finally, in Section 6 we offer some conclusions. 
 
2. Real Wages and Unemployment 
2.1 Trends in Real Wages 
For the first time since the Great Depression, real wages in the UK are experiencing sustained 
falls in the absence of direct government wage controls. Even in the 1980s and 1990s recessions, 
real wage growth paused rather than going into reverse and a general picture of a steady real wage 
growth dominated the UK labour market through the 1980s and 1990s. The recent turnaround in 
real wage growth and the slowdown that has ensued as compared to the previous two decades is 
shown in Figure 1.  
The Figure shows real weekly wage growth since 1979 for all workers aged 16-65 from 
the most reliable series, the New Earnings Survey (NES)/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) employer reported data that covers around 1 percent of the population. The Figure shows 
that at some point in the early 2000s - beginning around about 2003 - the picture of rising real 
wages, coupled with rising wage inequality through faster real wage growth higher up the wage 
distribution, ended. It is interesting that real wage growth stalled well before the onset of the deep 
recession of 2008/9, when the UK experienced the tightest labour market we have had since the 
1970s and with reasonable economic and productivity growth. That said, the Figure also makes it 
clear that falls in real wages occurred across the wage distribution with the onset of recession.  
The Figure uses the Retail Price Index (RPI) to adjust for inflation as this is the only series 
that covers the entire period. The more widely used measure currently is the Consumer Price 
Inflation CPI series which generally shows a lower degree of inflation through this period. This 
then suggests that median real wage growth continued albeit at a slow rate until 2007 and shows a 
slightly less marked fall since. Thus the CPI based measure suggests that the recent fall in real 
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wages is of the order of 9 percent which has taken wages back to the levels seen in the early 
2000s rather than the 11.5 percent or so represented in Figure 1. Even so such a fall is 
unprecedented since WWII. 
2.2 Trends in Unemployment  
As with the real wage trends, labour market performance in the recent past in the UK has 
evolved rather differently to what has happened in previous recessions. Typically, in periods of 
recession output falls and employment tends to fall to a similar or slightly greater degree, leaving 
productivity broadly stable and in turn real wages broadly stable as for the early 1990s 
recessionary period in Figure 1. As unemployment then falls back during recovery, growth feeds 
into wages to a greater degree than employment. This is the normal pattern that we had got 
accustomed to. Hence in the UK, as in other developed countries, the cyclical volatility of 
unemployment has been large relative to that of real wages, which has long puzzled economists 
(see Pissarides, 2009, or Kudlyak, 2010). 
These patterns have looked different in the last decade, however. By historical standards, 
Britain has been experiencing not just a severe recession, but what some commentators refer to as 
a ‘Great Recession’. Indeed, the fall in economic output in the recent recession was almost as 
large as the 1930s, but the recovery has been markedly slower. Output was nearly 4 percent below 
peak levels four years on from the start of the recession. By the same stage, the 1930s economy 
was in a sustained recovery. 
One possible reason why things may not feel like a Depression is that the loss of 
employment has been relatively modest, with a fall in employment of just over 2 per cent of jobs 
compared to around 6 per cent in the previous two recessions. Indeed, a jobs recovery started as 
soon as the economy showed some growth in late 2009 and has held up well in the long period of 
economic stagnation that started in the second half of 2010. Figure 2 shows the ILO 
unemployment rate between 1979 and 2012. It shows very clearly how much unemployment 
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came down before the early 2000s, dropping from 10.6 per cent in 1993 to 5 per cent by 2003.  
The sharp increase in the late 2000s recession, with a rise from around just under 5 to a little over 
8 percent, is also evident but flattens off relatively quickly after the recession ended and at 
significantly lower levels than after the two preceding milder recessions. 
Putting these patterns of output and employment/unemployment change together makes it clear 
that productivity growth has stalled since 2006, which in historical terms is a remarkably 
sustained period (see the discussion by Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2014). The UK thus has output 
about 6 per cent below that recorded in previous recoveries of this maturity, but employment is 4 
percent higher – this 10 percent productivity differential of producing less with more people is 
huge (see Blundell et al., 2014, and Wadsworth, 2013). Moreover, with cuts in employment 
resulting in ‘productivity improvements’ in the public sector, the gap appears to be concentrated 
in the private sector. 
2.3 Real Wages and Unemployment 
The recognition that unemployment can act to restrain wages dates back to the classical 
economists (for example, Marx’s discussion of the reserve army of labour). In modern economics, 
the Phillips Curve (Phillips, 1958) had suggested a stable relationship existed between 
unemployment levels and wage growth, with higher unemployment restraining nominal (not 
adjusted for inflation) wage changes. This empirical relationship lacked any theoretical 
foundations except the plausible principle that ‘when demand for labour is high and there are very 
few unemployed we should expect employers to bid wage rates up quite rapidly’.  
However, this relationship broke down in the period of high inflation in the 1970s and 
newer theoretical and empirical evidence moved to suggest that unemployment regulates the rate 
of real wage growth, the mark up of wage growth over inflation, rather than nominal wage 
changes. Thus low unemployment was associated with not just higher wage growth, but a 
situation where wage growth exceeded productivity could lead to a slow but steadily upward 
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wage-price spiral. In this setting, the level of unemployment that holds wage growth and inflation 
steady was called the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment or NAIRU (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman, 1991) or the sustainable rate of unemployment by politicians. More 
recently, this real wage-unemployment debate has been revisited with Gali (2011) suggesting that 
the Phillips Curve has re-emerged in the US at least and arguing that, with wage setting rigidities 
the Phillips Curve relationship where unemployment restrains nominal rather than real wage 
growth, does have plausible theoretical underpinning.   
 Other empirical work has studied the relationship between the level of wages and local 
unemployment, via the existence of the so-called 'wage curve' (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994, 1995; and the meta-study of Nijkamp and Poot, 2005). Sargan (1964) also noted that the 
steady state (long run) solution to the Phillips' curve specifies that the level of wages depends on 
the level of unemployment. Moreover, in US work, Hines, Hoynes and Krueger (2001) argue that 
a relationship between the levels of unemployment and (real) wage levels both fits the data better 
and has a better justified theoretical justification to show how unemployment can restrain wages.   
 Higher unemployment acts to restrain the level of real wages in three potential ways. First, 
in times of high unemployment workers have a reduced scope to push for higher wages because 
of the lower availability of better alternative offers from other employers. Secondly, because 
workers fear job loss more when there are so many more people to compete against to get a 
replacement job, they may cede wages to hold on to a job. Finally, new job openings are flooded 
with applicants and firms can secure well qualified labour at lower wages than in better times.  
Evidence suggests, however, that the unemployed and employed workers are not close 
competitors. Workers losing their jobs are disproportionately drawn from the ranks of the lower 
paid (Gregg et al., 2012). Even then on return to work, wages are substantially lower than prior to 
job loss (Nickell, Quintini and Jones, 2002), especially for longer periods of unemployment, and 
part of these wage losses persist for long periods. Those suffering from longer periods of 
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unemployment also struggle to maintain stable employment, suffering further periods of 
unemployment even 15 or more years later (Gregg, 2001). Part of the permanent loss of earnings 
stems from this instability of later employment or repeat job loss (Gregg and Tominey, 2005). 
This all suggests that many unemployed struggle on the margins of the labour market rather than 
acting as close substitutes for those in stable work. The more concentrated unemployment is on 
individuals (via long-term unemployment), regions or skill groups is likely to reduce this 
competition effect and reduce the downward pressure on wages (Nickell and Bell, 1995). Hence 
the unemployment sensitivity of real wages for workers already in employment, especially for 
higher paid or more educated workers, has regularly been found to be lower than for the unskilled 
for whom the elasticity of the wage curve is larger.  
 Of course, the recent evidence of slower real wage growth described in Section 2 does not 
necessarily mean that wage setting has become any more sensitive to unemployment. The pay 
restraints imposed by government in the 1970s are widely thought to have led to a build of wage 
pressure that was released after 1979, just as unemployment was rising and trade union influence 
began to decline, which is again widely thought to have led to reduced wage pressure. Hence, this 
period saw quite rapid wage growth among middle to high earners, despite high unemployment, 
and thus rising wage inequality (Machin, 1996, 2011).  
Possibly more pertinent to the current period is the large scale migration from A8 
countries from 2004, which could also have placed extra downward pressure on wages. Note that 
such migration would be focused on areas of high job demand and hence low unemployment. So 
this would tend to dampen the sensitivity of wages to local variations in unemployment as labour 
is arrives into these areas from overseas. So wage pressure in an economy may increase or 
decrease without any changed particular sensitivity to unemployment levels or indeed may 
actually go the other way and generate reduced sensitivity to local unemployment conditions 
through increased labour supply.   
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 Thus, it is hard to assess whether this period of constrained real wage growth since 2003 
reflects an increased sensitivity to unemployment from looking at aggregate data. It may simply 
reflect an aggregate slowdown in wage pressure for reasons unconnected to prevailing levels of 
unemployment. So to explore this question of wages have become more sensitive to 
unemployment, we begin by looking at the macroeconomic picture, and then move on to study 
regions over time. We wish to assess the sensitivity of wages to local unemployment to study 
whether this relationship appears to have strengthened and therefore resulted in poor real wage 
growth and thereby increased the importance of low unemployment for delivering real wage 
growth. If this is the case, we also need to consider whether such effects are more or less 
pronounced in different parts of the wage distribution. 
Modelling Approach 
  We begin by running exploratory time series regressions at the economy wide level of the 
form: 
t11t11t utλ)Log(Uδα)Log(W +++= −  (1) 
where W is the real wage, U the unemployment rate, t a time trend and u is a random error.  
 Equation (1) relates the log real wage in period t solely to the log unemployment rate in 
period (t-1) and a trend. The key unemployment level term is lagged one period to reduce the 
potential for current prevailing economic conditions to be both driving unemployment and wage 
movements. However, we also respecify the formulation to allow for possible changes in 
unemployment to affect real wages as follows: 
t21t2t22t vtλ)Log(Uδ)∆Log(Uβα)Log(W ++++= −  (2) 
where the particular functional form adopted for the unemployment rate allows for short run 
effect (measured by the coefficient β2) of changes in log unemployment to affect log real wages.3 
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 This is, of course, a particular functional form including t and (t-1) dated log unemployment as independent 
variables. We prefer to specify this way so as to obtain estimates of the δ’s. 
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Estimating (1) and (2) for the whole period and two sub-periods before and after 2003 with 
annual data means that the sample size is low and therefore we very much think of this as an 
initial exploratory analysis of the wage sensitivity of unemployment. As such it is not feasible to 
isolate the role of unemployment from any other cyclical economic performance measures.  
Pooled regional–time series panel data, sometimes referred to as meso-level analysis lying 
in between macro-aggregate and micro-individual level, offers a way forward. We consider two 
variants of the more general equation (2) within this approach at the regional level r: 
rtrt331tr,3rt3rrt uXθtλ)Log(Uδ)∆Log(Uβα)Log(W +++++= −  (3) 
rtrt4t1tr,4rt4rrt vXθT)Log(Uδ)∆Log(Uβα)Log(W +++++= −  (4) 
The models in (3) and (4) differ from the aggregate model first by the inclusion of regional fixed 
effects (αr) and second because in some specifications we add regional controls Xrt to control for 
composition changes.4 The latter include regional proportions of the workforce by age, education 
(proportion with a degree), gender and race.  
Equations (3) and (4) differ in their modelling of common macroeconomic effects. The 
first model includes a time trend to do so, whilst the second includes a full set of year 
dummies	T. Thus our main parameter of interest in the first equation, δ3, captures an aggregate 
economic cycle in terms of (detrended) unemployment changes and regional specific deviations 
from this aggregate cycle. The inclusion of year dummies in the second equation conditions out 
the aggregate economic cycle and the parameter of interest, δ4, captures an effect identified solely 
off of the regional deviations from the aggregate cycle. 
In our main models, we consider the median log real wage as the dependent variable of 
interest. However, we also present results at decile intervals across the wage distribution so as to 
assess how widespread any shift in real wage formation, both in terms of underlying trend wage 
growth and sensitivity to unemployment, has been across the wage distribution.  We also present 
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a range of robustness tests, looking at models incorporating wage dynamics (as Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1995, or Bell et al., 2002), using different price deflators to define the real wage, 
excluding London from the analysis and replacing the unemployment rate with its employment 
counterpart. 
3. Data 
We use employer reported wages data from the New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings (NES/ASHE). This is an approximately 1 percent sample of all workers based on 
the last two digits of their National Insurance number. The data is drawn from firms’ 
administrative pay records on a common reporting basis and represents the most accurate UK 
wage data. From 1979 to 2003, this was called the New Earnings Survey (NES) and from 2004 
onwards the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).5  
For most of our analysis, we consider weekly wages (in 2012 prices, deflating by the retail 
price index, RPI) at different decile points of the wage distribution. Our initial analysis considers 
log real wages at the median, or 50th percentile, of the distribution (i.e. for the worker exactly 
halfway up - or down - the wage distribution). We also study wages at different points in the 
overall distribution, looking at workers at intervals for each tenth of the working population (the 
10th, 20th…… up to the 90th percentiles of the distribution). The pay records on men and women 
are included for all those aged 16 to 65. The pay includes reported bonuses and overtime, but not 
in kind payments such as share options.  
We have put together a regional panel of data on wages from the NES/ASHE data and 
unemployment rates from the Labour Force Survey for the standard regions of Britain: North 
East; North West; Yorkshire and Humberside; East Midlands; West Midlands; East Anglia; 
                                                          
5
 It is worth noting that there are some aspects of the sampling and data collection structure that could cause some 
changes in NES/ASHE series over time. These include the introduction of weights, changed definitions of 
incentive/bonus pay (in 2005) and occupational coding changes that affect weights (in 2007 and 2011). We use 
unweighted data and so only the 2005 change is of any relevance, and since we perform our analysis at regional or 
aggregate level, any impact should be minimal. See the online Data Appendix for more detail. 
12 
 
London; South East; South West; Wales; and Scotland. The sample we use covers these eleven 
regions for the years 1986 through 2012.6 More details are given in the on-line Data Appendix. 
  
4. Changes in Real Wages 
Figure 1 is suggestive of a temporal break in real wage growth across the wage distribution that 
occurred in the early 2000s. This pattern of growing wage inequality and a recent slowdown in 
wage growth is also shown in Table 1 where the greater magnitudes of the trends in the real wage 
growth higher up the distribution can be seen. Panel A of table 1 shows that over the period 1979 
to 2002 real wages grew by 0.65 percent per annum for workers at the 10th percentile of the wage 
distribution, by 1.41 percent per annum at the median and by 2.15 percent per annum at the 90th 
percentile.  
 Since 2003, however, a break in trend occurs.7 The final column of the Table shows the 
picture from 2003. For low wage workers, at the 10th percentile of the distribution, falling real 
wages post-2003 more than totally offsets the previous growth for low paid workers from 1979 up 
to then. This partly reflects the rise of part-time working over this period, as its weekly wages that 
are reported here and also the use of the RPI deflator which is discussed below. However, even at 
the median the faster rate of earnings growth of the 1979-2002 period is matched on a per annum 
basis by falls after 2002 with negative real wage growth again of -1.39 percent per year. At the 
90th percentile the shift is to slightly lesser falls in wages of -0.99 percent per annum. Panel B of 
Table 1 repeats the picture but starting in 1986, the period over which our estimation of the 
sensitivity of real wages to unemployment is undertaken in the analysis that follows. The patterns 
are very similar.  
                                                          
6
 The start year of 1986 is dictated to us as it is the first year when we can use the ILO definition of unemployment 
from the Labour Force Survey. 
7
 In an earlier version of this paper, we presented Figures showing trend predicted wages for the whole period and up 
to 2003 alone.  These confirmed the existence of a break around 2003, but showing them does not add substantively 
to the discussion of the numbers in Table 1 (results available on request from the authors). 
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Thus, the labour market experienced a shift away from positive real wage growth that 
started around 2003. So far the real wages numbers we have discussed deflated by the RPI, which 
is the only series of consumer price inflation available over the full period we consider. It is, 
however, well known though that the RPI produces higher price inflation than now routinely used 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). The differences are partly due to the fact that the CPI does not 
include housing costs for owner occupiers (reflecting mortgage costs and house prices), but also 
has a different calculation method which leads to a lower estimated increase in prices (see Office 
for National Statistics, 2012, for detailed discussion of alternative price measures). The CPI, 
however, is only available from 1988. Producer price inflation as captured by the GDP deflator 
suggests an even lower rate of price increases. More recently the Office for National Statistics 
have released a revised RPI series (RPIJ) which uses the same basket of goods as in the RPI, but 
the methodology is more similar to the CPI. This is only available back to 1998.  
Figure 3 shows the time series evolutions of these four price indexes, for the time periods 
for which they are available (and set to 100 in 2012). It confirms that there are differences over 
time in the levels of price inflation that they depict. In panel C of Table 1 we thus repeat the 
median wage growth exercise using these alternative price deflators (on shorter time periods). 
Using these deflators does show higher real wage growth at the median over the whole 1988 to 
2012 time period, and real wage falls since 2003, but at a rate that is just over one half of a 
percent lower per annum than when the RPI deflator is used. This then makes a material 
difference to the picture of real wage movements over data period but the slowdown in wage 
growth and recent falls are still very much apparent. In the recent post-2002 period the GDP 
deflator shows a distinctly slower rate of growth than even the CPI suggesting a modest wedge 
between real wages from the perspective of producers and consumer wages over this period. 
Thus, in the next Section where we move on to report results from estimating real wage-
unemployment sensitivities from economy wide and regional real wage equations between 1986 
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and 2012, we also discuss what happens when different price deflators are used to define wages in 
real terms.  
 
5. Estimates of Changing Real Wage-Unemployment Sensitivities 
5.1 Economy Wide Median Real Wage Equations 
Table 2 shows real wage-unemployment sensitivities estimated from aggregate equations 
(equations (1) and (2) from Section 2 above). The upper panel of the Table shows estimates from 
a specification relating the (log of the median) real wage to the (log) unemployment rate and a 
linear trend that picks up the underlying growth rate of real wages. The lower panel additionally 
includes the change in the (log) unemployment rate. In each panel results are shown in columns 
(1) and (2) for the whole 1986-2012 period, with column (1) specifying a linear trend and in 
column (2) this is split for periods before and after 2003 (1986-2002 and 2003-2012).  
In the specifications reported in both columns, the first thing to note is that there is a 
significant wage restraining impact of lagged unemployment on median real wages. In column (2) 
of Table 2 we report an estimated elasticity for the full period of -0.102 in the upper panel and -
0.088 in the lower panel. The column (1) specification, which does not allow for a shift in trend 
real wage growth, displays a far higher elasticity (of -0.175 in the upper panel and -0.179 in the 
lower panel). In both specifications of the lower panel estimates, the current period change in 
unemployment is poorly determined suggesting that we are not picking up effects of the economic 
cycle on wages other than through the lagged effect of higher unemployment. 
Considering the magnitudes of these estimates, it is worth noting that in the first year of 
our sample (1986) unemployment was high and nearly halved by 2002. Of course it has also risen 
sharply in the recent downturn: as we described in the Introduction, the trough to peak rise from 
2003 to 2012 was 79 percent. The column (2) estimates of the trend coefficients suggest that 
wages were growing at an underlying rate of 0.8 percent per annum before 2003, but were also 
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boosted by the halving of unemployment. From 2003 onwards, they grew at an underlying rate of 
-0.5 percent in the upper panel equations (from the difference in the trend coefficients, 0.008 - 
0.013), and by -0.6 percent in the lower panel equations. Over and above this, flat or falling real 
wage growth occurred as a consequence of the wage dampening effects of rising unemployment.        
 However, these first estimates do not explore whether there is variation in both the 
unemployment sensitivity for the sub-periods 1986-2002 and 2003-2012. This is shown in the 
columns (3) and (4) where we allow differential effects for both trend wage growth and 
unemployment for each period.  The unemployment restraining effect rises sharply, between the 
two time periods, in the upper panel going from -0.062 to -0.184, or a change of -0.122, and in the 
lower panel going from -0.056 to -0.151, corresponding to a change of -0.095. Hence, the wage 
dampening unemployment effect is far greater post-2003 (although the change reported in the 
final column of Table 2 for the lower panel models is not very precisely estimated owing to the 
small sample sizes).  
The estimates also suggest underlying wage growth was a little bit higher in both periods 
than when we do not allow for a shift in the impact of unemployment (annual rises of 0.9 percent 
pre-2003 in upper and lower panels and falls of 0.2 percent for the upper panel and 0.4 percent for 
the lower panel after). So compared to the raw slowdown in real wage growth of 2.7 percent 
(panel B Table 1), conditional on unemployment and the increasing sensitivity of wages to 
unemployment this becomes a more modest 1.0 percent (upper panel) and 1.3 percent (lower 
panel). Thus, it does seem from the macroeconomic time series estimates, that wages are sensitive 
to unemployment levels and in the period when real wages ceased their trend growth, they 
became more sensitive to unemployment.  
Regional Median Real Wage Equations 
The aggregate economy wide data we have used so far has two potential drawbacks. First, 
the second post-2003 time period we consider constitutes only ten annual data points which is 
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very short to isolate a statistically precise increase in the effects of unemployment on real wages 
and any underlying slowdown in real wage growth. Second, the only measure of the economic 
cycle we have modelled is unemployment and anything else that is happening at the same time, 
such as changes in firm profitability or shifts in aggregate demand, could show up as an 
unemployment effect. To address these issues, we therefore also estimated results from the 
regional panel on real wages and unemployment. 
Table 3 reports estimated elasticities of the regional median real weekly wage with respect 
to the regional unemployment rate from the previous year (from the regional wage curve 
specifications described in equation (3) of Section 2). The upper panel reports results from the 
same model specification as the lower panel of Table 2 (i.e. the more general model with a time 
trend) but here the sensitivity of real wages to unemployment in each region is considered, 
increasing the amount of information available. The estimated sensitivity of wages to 
unemployment now reflects the aggregate cycle seen in Table 2 and the local deviation from that 
national picture. 
As before we start in column (1) with a single equation model not allowing for any 
temporal shifts in parameters over the time period considered. Column (2) introduces a set of 
region and time varying labour market characteristics. The latter variables are designed to pick up 
compositional shifts in the workforce such as the increasing share of the workforce that is women 
as well as cyclical composition shifts that might occur with the less skilled/educated dropping out 
of the workforce in a downturn. The controls capture education level (the proportion with a 
degree), age, gender and ethnicity. From the reported specification, it seems that from comparing 
the trend coefficient in column (2) to column (1) that composition adjusted underlying wage 
growth was a little slower than without these controls, mainly due to increasing education levels 
in the workforce. 
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Focusing now on the models which split the sample period, reported in columns (4) and 
(5) of Table 3, there is again a marked increased sensitivity of real wages to unemployment in the 
post-2002 period. 8  The wage equations include regional fixed effects and so the estimated 
elasticities can be interpreted in terms of changes in levels. As shown in the final column, the 
magnitude of the increased sensitivity of wages to local unemployment conditions is -0.062 
(going from -0.059 to -0.121), which is strongly significant. Underlying wage growth, conditional 
on shifts in unemployment is slightly negative at 0.5 percent per annum after 2002, whereas it 
was around 1.1 percent per annum prior to this point.   
The specifications in the second panel of Table 4 include a full set of year effects in place 
of the trend. This is a more general specification where any year to year movements in wages 
arising from any other source than unemployment will be captured, including the aggregate 
economic cycle, by the year dummies. Thus, the estimated effect of regional unemployment only 
reflects the year to year movements in regional unemployment that differ from the national 
picture. In some ways, this is a tough ask of the data as the general aggregate rise and fall in 
unemployment with the economic cycle is discounted and as the measure of unemployment is 
from a survey (the Labour Force Survey), year to year deviations from national patterns will 
include movements due to sampling variability which could lead to attenuation bias. Interestingly, 
however, in terms of changes through time, we see the same pattern of results as for the economy 
wide analysis and the regional analysis incorporating trends alone.  
Column (4) in panel B of Table 3 shows that the estimated regional real wage-
unemployment sensitivities show no significant relationship in the 1986-2002 time period, which 
                                                          
8
 One pertinent question, already alluded to at times earlier in the paper, is whether 2003 is the year where a structural 
break occurs. We conducted a Chow test for the existence of a break in the trend of real wages for years 2002, 2003 
and 2004 and concluded that in statistical terms the structural break does occur then. With a trend being the only 
explanatory variable, the F-statistic for a structural break in the year 2002 is 331.23, in the year 2003 is 344.98 and in 
the year 2004 is 342.85. However, with a trend and lagged unemployment as explanatory variables the F-statistic for 
2002 is 288.81, for 2003 is 326.27 and for 2004 is 315.94. Adding a lagged wage to the trend and lagged 
unemployment regressors, the F-statistics become 1044.00, 1122.97 and 1017.50 for 2002, 2003 and 2004, 
respectively.  
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says that there was no independent regional effect above the economy wide cycle. However, in 
column (5) there is a significant negative relationship in the recent 2003-12 time period (i.e. 
showing a 5.4 percent fall in wages when unemployment doubles, or a 3.8 percent fall for the 79 
percent trough to peak rise in the unemployment rate in the 2003 to 2012 time period). Thus, real 
wages became significantly more sensitive to unemployment at the regional level in this latter 
period and the estimates are broadly in line with the greater sensitivity to the aggregate cycle seen 
in the macro-time series and pooled regional-time series models. The change is strongly 
significant in statistical terms. 
Overall, the regional results are suggestive of a general slowdown in real wage growth 
combined with growing sensitivity to local unemployment.9 We can retrieve the year dummies 
from the models in panel B and relate these to macro-level unemployment conditions in the same 
way as in Table 2.10 The results from carrying out this exercise are shown in Table A1 of the 
Appendix and they suggest a somewhat lower sensitivity of wages to unemployment than seen in 
the unadjusted macroeconomic results of Table 2, but again in terms of numerical magnitudes the 
shift in the sensitivity (of -0.038) is broadly similar in magnitude to that seen in panels A and B of 
Table 3 (where the wage curves become more elastic through shifts of -0.062 and -0.050 
respectively). 
5.2 Regional Real Wage Equations Across the Distribution 
Table 4 repeats the empirical exercise in panel B of Table 3, but considering different 
percentiles of the wage distribution in the regional panel. Estimates of decile specific real wage-
unemployment elasticities for 1986-2002 and 2003-10 are reported, along with the change in 
these elasticities across the two sub-periods.  
                                                          
9
 We also estimated specifications where the dependent variable was the full-time weekly wage or the hourly wage 
and if the employment rate, rather than the unemployment rate, was entered on the right hand side of the estimating 
equation. These all produced qualitatively similar findings, which are available from the authors on request. 
10
 In doing so, the retrieved dummies reflect an average of the regions rather than the raw national average as they 
have been adjusted for shifts in regional workforce composition. 
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The results in the Table show real wages to be far more sensitive to unemployment for the 
lower paid. However, at almost all deciles local unemployment becomes more important in the 
second period – the 10th percentile being the exception – so that the real wage-unemployment 
elasticities became bigger (in absolute magnitude) in the second time period. The different 
behaviour at the 10th percentile is most likely because the minimum wage propped up wages in 
the 2000s after its introduction in 1999. In the regional context, this will be likely to have boosted 
wages most in low wage and mostly high unemployment areas, thus lowering the relationship 
between wages and local unemployment. However, for the rest of the distribution, one sees 
unemployment restraining real wages by more in the 2003-12 time period. For higher wage 
workers the picture that is important for wage setting was more the national than the regional one 
and hence when we take out the economy wide cycle the sensitivity to just local conditions in the 
earlier time period was low to non-existent. Yet the estimates suggest that the sensitivity to local 
conditions has become increasingly important. This would be consistent with a decline in national 
pay setting and union bargaining toward more localised pay setting. This pattern was also 
identified by Nickell and Faggio (2005), and we return to this in our general discussion below.   
5.3 Tests of Robustness 
Table 5 reports some robustness checks. Panel A reports results from a model where we 
include regional wage dynamics through a lagged dependent variable (see for example, 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, and Bell et al., 2002). It also includes the current rather than 
lagged unemployment rate as per the wage curve analysis of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). Of 
course, this automatically adds extra difficulties as the coefficient on the lag is now biased and 
needs to be instrumented. Likewise current unemployment is likely to be correlated with other 
cyclical variables and likewise instrumentation is a sensible response.  
A specification that enters the current (dated t) log unemployment rate in the dynamic 
wage equation and instruments using lags of wages and the unemployment rate produces 
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qualitatively similar effects to our main analysis. The wage-sensitivity of unemployment falls 
from -0.005 to -0.069, thus changing by 0.064 (as compared to the Table 3 change of 0.050). The 
wage dynamics appear unchanged however, suggesting that the fall in real wages is not driven by 
faster wage adjustment to unemployment shocks but rather by greater magnitudes of these effects. 
This model also supports the representation as a levels on levels model since the estimated 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significantly below unity, which would have 
implied that the level of unemployment was regulated the rate of real wage growth.  
A second robustness check, reported in Panel B, shows what happens if we use the GDP 
deflator, rather than the RPI which noted earlier produces a higher estimate of price inflation. The 
results remain robust, with the coefficient on the lagged unemployment rate showing a change of 
-0.050. We also re-estimated the upper panel Table 3 models for the slightly shorter period (1988 
onwards) where three alternative inflation measures (the RPI, CPI and the GDP deflator) are 
available – these results are given in Appendix Table A2, with a significant strengthening of the 
real wage-unemployment sensitivity occurring (to slightly different degrees) for all measures.11 
A third robustness check that we undertook was to exclude London from the regional 
panel, on the grounds that the economic structure of London is rather different (e.g. with the City 
of London financial centre and higher house prices than in other parts of the country). This made 
little difference to the reported results, as is shown in the results reported in panel C of Table 5.   
Finally, we explored replacing the regional unemployment rate with the employment rate. 
This directly represents the availability of employment in the region without possible 
confounding effects of changes in labour supply.  The estimates show a qualitatively similar 
pattern, in terms of a significant strengthening of the real wage-employment sensitivity in the 
2003-12 time period. Note here that changes in the employment rate are much smaller in 
                                                          
11
 Of course, the inclusion of year dummies in the lower panel means it does not matter which price index we use as 
we get the same results since the dummies wash out the aggregate variation. 
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proportionate terms (since we adopt a log-log formulation) when compared to the unemployment 
rate and hence the coefficients are ten times larger. 
5.4 Discussion and Interpretation 
The evidence of an increase in the sensitivity of real wages to (local) unemployment 
conditions appears strong and robust to a number of alternative representations. Our analysis so 
far does not, however, shed any light on why this may have occurred. In this sub-section we offer 
an initial exploratory assessment of some of the more obvious potential explanations.  
The regressions reported so far have been based on weekly pay and so an obvious starting 
point might be to assess whether hours of work have become more cyclical. The very rapid 
growth of under-employment - when people report they are in part-time jobs because they are not 
able to find full-time work - through the recession might be evidence for this. The numbers 
reporting under-employment rose from 600,000 to 1.4 million between 2008 and 2012 and are yet 
to fall back. Yet in the 1990s recession the peak was around just 800,000. There has also been 
much media discussion of the rise of zero hours contracts. In a similar vein, it may be the case 
that pay contingent of firm performance, such as bonuses and incentive pay systems, have 
become more prevalent raising the sensitivity to the economic cycle.  
The results in panel A and B of Table 6 enable some assessment of these possibilities. 
Gregg and Wadsworth (2011) report that hours were not unusually volatile through this recession 
compared to previous ones and the results in panel A shows that switching to using an hourly pay 
measure shows no material difference in the results. Thus, the rise in unmet demand for full-time 
work appears to reflect people seeking to work more hours as falls in real wages bite than it does 
an unusual increase in part-time working. Panel B reports estimates based on ‘Basic Pay’, that is 
excluding overtime and all bonuses/incentive payments. There is a definitional change concerning 
incentive payments in our data in 2004 (this is discussed fully in the on-line Data Appendix) but 
this does not seem to affect the key result that basic pay has become more sensitive to 
22 
 
unemployment by as much as total pay has. Thus the results of panels A and B of Table 6 does 
not seem to suggest that changing patterns of hours of work and the composition of types of pay 
are driving our main result.   
The sizable uptick in net immigration that followed the accession of eight eastern 
European countries to the EU in 2004 is broadly coincident in time with the apparent slowdown 
in wage growth in our data. However, migrants are likely to flow to locations with strong 
networks and job opportunities. So with likely exception of London they are likely to head for 
low unemployment areas and regions and as such are more likely, if anything, to be pushing 
wages down in lower unemployment regions and thus are unlikely to be driving our main result. 
We explore this by including a variable at the regional level measuring the proportion of UK 
citizens. As shown in panel C of Table 6, this variable does not attract a significant coefficient in 
either time period, nor does it affect the changing unemployment sensitivity by much, which 
remains statistically significant at -0.046.  
Finally, collective wage agreements in Britain have been declining for the last thirty years 
or so. According to data from the Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations Surveys, the 
proportion of workplaces with 25 or more employees which had recognised trade unions fell from 
64 percent in 1980 to 53 percent by 1990, 38 percent by 2004 and to 37 percent by 2011.12 The 
proportion in the private sector with union recognition is only 17 percent by 2011 in workplaces 
with 25 or more employees, and even lower at 11 percent for those with 5 or more employees.13 
Thus union decline in Britain has been occurring over a long period and the unionization rate has 
fallen to become very low in historical terms.14 
In the ASHE data we use, there is some information on this through details of five 
categories of wage setting within the workplaces where our sample are employed. These 
                                                          
12
 The 1980 to 2004 numbers come from Brown, Bryson and Forth (2009). We thank Alex Bryson for supplying us 
with the consistently defined number for 2011. 
13
 These numbers from the 2011 WERS are from van Wanrooy et al (2013). 
14
 See also Machin (2000). 
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categories do not discuss trade union presence, but rather whether wages are set according to 
national/industry agreements or organisation wide pay structures from 2004 onwards. Even this 
less restrictive measure (i.e. union and non-union) of the presence of organisation wide 
agreements shows a decline, falling from covering 43 percent of workers in 2004 to 38 percent in 
2012.  
This decline in national organisational pay setting and longer-term decline in unionization 
and union bargaining may well be contributing to the growing sensitivity to local unemployment. 
This was also identified as a potential suspect of changing wage-unemployment relations in 
earlier work by Nickell and Faggio (2005) who suggest that the early declines in collective 
agreements had increased the sensitivity wages to unemployment already in the 1980s. Table 7 
thus shows results where we look at the wage sensitivity to unemployment for those covered and 
uncovered by some form of collective agreement. As noted above, the definition of covered and 
uncovered differs irreconcilably between the pre-2004 measures, which comprise a list of major 
national collective bargain agreements with trade unions, and that from 2004, which is based on 
indicators of pay setting systems operated by companies. Hence the aim here cannot be to 
compare across time periods, but across covered and uncovered sectors.  
The results of Table 7 show that in the uncovered sectors wages are significantly more 
sensitive to regional unemployment movements that for those where some form of national pay 
setting occurs at the industry or company level. Therefore, in line with Nickell and Faggio (2005), 
the decline of such pay setting structures is likely to have raised the sensitivity of wages to 
unemployment. However, this is likely to be reflecting a general longer term shift, not least since 
sustained union decline has been happening since the late 1970s, rather than being something 
particular to the more recent period. As such, whilst it is likely to have been a contributing factor, 
this is probably only partial at best. 
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The last obvious possibility, which is hard to test empirically, is welfare reform. From 
1996 successive governments have progressively increased the extent of required activity 
undertaken by those receiving welfare payments. This is described as the increase in ‘welfare 
conditionality’ and breaches are associated with sanctions, reductions in cash payments, which in 
turn have become more severe. Starting with the unemployed, this conditionality has been 
extended to lone parents and most recently to those with less severe health and disability issues. 
Claimants are thus required to undertake and provide evidence of activity, principally job search.  
At the same time has occurred the development of a system of tax credits which supplement low 
wages mainly for those with children. The increased pressure to take low waged work and 
compensation for doing so may have increased the willingness of workers to trade lower wages 
for employment, and also their substitutability for low wage workers. However, this argument 
feels more apposite for the lower third of wage distribution, roughly the main portion for 
coverage of tax credits, whereas we see the increased unemployment sensitivity across the wage 
distribution. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we document and study the fact that real wage growth has stagnated in the UK since 
around 2003 and has, unlike in past recessionary periods, turned negative since 2009. We ask 
whether this can be related to high unemployment holding back wages, that was either not 
present, or was less marked, in the period of real wage growth that came before. We highlight that 
since 2003, the slowdown, stagnation and recent real wage falls have occurred across the wage 
distribution.  
From an analysis of economy-wide data and of regional panel on real wages and 
unemployment, we find the same pattern of results. We document the nature of real wage changes 
across the wage distribution over the last three decades, showing that the recent period of stagnant 
real wage growth represents a break of trend that pre-dates the onset of recession. Our statistical 
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analysis that shows that an increased sensitivity of real wages to unemployment appears to have 
been an important factor in this slowdown of real wage growth, with real wage-unemployment 
sensitivities becoming more marked in the period of poor real wage growth. This is strongly the 
case, with a doubling of unemployment driving down real wages by around 5 to 6 percent more in 
the 2003-12 time period than earlier (including the 1990s recession).  
Thinking about what this means in monetary terms, the increase in unemployment that 
took place between its low in 2005 (4.6 per cent) and its peak in late-2011 (8.3 per cent) would be 
associated with a reduction of around £1040-1240 in the annual earnings of someone working 
full-time at the median rate of pay in the more recent period compared to what would have 
occurred in earlier decades.   
On the one hand, this increased sensitivity has driven down real wage levels compared to 
what would otherwise have been the case. On the other, this may well have limited the extent of 
job losses in the recent deep recession. Of course, while we show that unemployment has been a 
factor, it is not the only variable driving real wage stagnation post 2003. There has still been a 
slowdown in underlying trend in real wage growth from around 1.5 percent per annum to 
stagnation. On top of this stagnation of wages increased unemployment has been pressing down 
on wages with a heavier weight than before, turning this stagnation into falling real wages.  
We remain less clear on precisely why the unemployment sensitivity has increased but 
what we have been able to do in terms of possible explanations suggests it may, at least in part in 
the longer term, be a consequence of the weakening of labour market institutions such as the 
coverage of trade unions and nationwide organisational pay scales. More recently, it may also 
reflect the impact of active welfare policies that have made the unemployed closer substitutes for 
those in work and tax credits which partially maintain incomes in the face of lower wages. Both 
of these fit into the idea that the presence of more elastic wage curves in recent times have come 
about as a result of greater labour market flexibility. 
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Finally, our findings open up a number of relevant research questions that need to be 
studied in more detail. The first is to compare changing patterns of real wage growth with other 
data sources. The second is to start to try and more fully understand what have been the proximate 
causes of the real wage slowdown, and why the level of unemployment is more strongly related to 
real wages in this recent period of poor real wage growth performance than it was before. A third, 
given our robust regional findings, is to consider the potential importance of differential degrees 
of labour market flexibility in different local labour markets. Hopefully, research in these areas 
will enable us to gain a better understanding of why real wage stagnation and falls have occurred 
and the extent to which increased real wage-unemployment sensitivities are more recently 
reflecting an impact of greater flexibility in the UK labour market. 
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Fig. 1. Real Wage Growth at the 10th, 50th and 90th Percentiles,  
Weekly Wages, 1979-2012 
 
 
Notes: From New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Weekly 
earnings deflated by RPI. The vertical line denotes 2003. 
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Fig.2. ILO Unemployment Rates, 1979-2012 
  
Notes: Quarterly data from ONS. ILO Unemployment Rates for 16+ (seasonally 
adjusted). Vertical dashed lines show recession quarters.  
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Fig. 3. Consumer Price Indices: A Comparison 
 
Notes: From ONS – see ONS (2012) for discussion of alternative price measures. 
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Table 1: Average Annual Percentage Real Wage Growth and Price Inflation 
 
A. Real Wage Growth,  
Full Time Period 1979-2012 
 
1979-2012 
 
1979-2002 
 
2003-2012 
    
10th Percentile  
 
-0.03 0.65 -1.83 
50th Percentile 
 
0.65 1.41 -1.39 
90th Percentile 1.30 2.15 -0.99 
    
B. Real Wage Growth, 
Sample Period 1986-2012 1986-2012 1986-2002 
 
2003-2012 
    
10th Percentile -0.08 0.84 -1.83 
    
50th Percentile 0.40 1.34 -1.39 
    
90th Percentile 0.94 1.96 -0.99 
    
C. Median Real Wage Growth, 
Different Indexes, 1988 to 2012 1988-2012 1988-2002 
 
2003-2012 
    
50th Percentile, RPI 0.13 1.04 -1.39 
    
50th Percentile, CPI 0.77 1.69 -0.75 
    
50th Percentile, GDP Deflator 0.80 1.58 -0.49 
    
50th Percentile, RPIJ . . -0.90 
    
Notes:  Numbers in panel A and B from NES/ASHE deflated by RPI, 2012 prices based on March each year. 
Numbers in panel C from NES/ASHE deflated by different price indexes, 2012 prices, either March or quarter one 
values.  
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Table 2: Aggregate Median Real Weekly Wages and Unemployment, 1986-2012 
  
Dependent Variable: Log(Median Real Weekly Wage) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) – (3) 
  
 
1986-2012 
 
 
1986-2012 
 
 
1986-2002 
 
 
2003-2012 
Change Between  
1986-2002 and 
2003-2012 
      
A. Estimates of Equation (1) 
 
     
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.175 -0.102 -0.062 -0.184 -0.122 
 (0.031) (0.023) (0.021) (0.059) (0.060) 
Trend 0.001 0.008 0.009 -0.002 -0.010 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Post-2002 Trend  -0.013    
  (0.003)    
R-Squared 0.818 0.901 0.911 0.819 0.916 
Sample Size 27 27 17 10 27 
 
     
B. Estimates of Equation (2) 
 
     
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.041 0.041 0.020 0.041 0.021 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.043) (0.069) (0.078) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.176 -0.088 -0.056 -0.151 -0.095 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.027) (0.101) (0.097) 
Trend 0.002 0.008 0.009 -0.004 -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Post-2002 Trend  -0.014    
  (0.004)    
      
R-Squared 0.826 0.907 0.911 0.828  
Sample Size 27 27 17 10  
      
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Regional Median Real Weekly Wages and Unemployment, 1986-2012 
 
  
Dependent Variable:  
Log(Regional Median Real Weekly Wage) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)-(4) 
  
 
1986-2012 
 
 
1986-2012 
 
 
1986-2012 
 
 
1986-2002 
 
 
2003-2012 
Change 
Between 
1986-2002 
and 2003-
2012 
 
A. Trend Specification 
 
      
∆Log(Unemployment Rate [t] ) -0.054 -0.069 -0.000 -0.022 0.011 0.033 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.020) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1] ) -0.145 -0.158 -0.082 -0.059 -0.121 -0.062 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.021) 
Trend 0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.011 -0.005 -0.015 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Post 2002 Trend   -0.016    
   (0.002)    
       
Region Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Regional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes  
       
R-Squared 0.927 0.951 0.966 0.980 0.970  
Sample Size 297 297 297 187 110  
       
B. Year Dummies Specification       
       
∆Log(Unemployment Rate [t] ) -0.002 -0.005  -0.007 -0.015 -0.008 
 (0.012) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1] ) 0.005 -0.013  -0.004 -0.054 -0.050 
 (0.015) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) 
       
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Regional Controls No Yes  Yes Yes  
       
R-Squared 0.983 0.988  0.992 0.994  
Sample Size 297 297  187 110  
       
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The time varying regional controls are from the Labour Force Survey 
and are the proportion with a degree, female, young and white in the regional workforce. 
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Table 4: Regional Estimates Across the Wage Distribution 
   
Dependent Variable:  
Log(ith Percentile Real Weekly Wage) 
 
  (1) (2) (2)-(1) 
  
 
1986-2002 
 
2003-2012 
 
 
Change Between 
1986-2002 and 
2003-2012 
 
    
10th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.036(0.033) -0.050(0.034) -0.014(0.047) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.119(0.031) -0.075(0.042) 0.044(0.052) 
 
    
20th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.015(0.019) -0.040(0.026) -0.024(0.032) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.038(0.018) -0.077(0.029) -0.039(0.034) 
     
30th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.009(0.013) -0.012(0.016) -0.003(0.021) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.015(0.012) -0.056(0.018) -0.041(0.021) 
 
    
40th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.012(0.010) -0.009(0.014) 0.003(0.017) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.007(0.010) -0.048(0.015) -0.041(0.018) 
 
    
50th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.007(0.010) -0.015(0.013) -0.008(0.016) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.004(0.010) -0.054(0.013) -0.050(0.016) 
 
    
60th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.004(0.010) -0.029(0.013) -0.024(0.016) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) 0.003(0.009) -0.050(0.012) -0.054(0.015) 
 
    
70th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.005(0.009) -0.038(0.012) -0.034(0.015) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) 0.003(0.009) -0.051(0.012) -0.054(0.015) 
 
    
80th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) 0.004(0.010) -0.020(0.012) -0.024(0.016) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.002(0.008) -0.034(0.013) -0.032(0.016) 
 
    
90th 
Percentile 
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) 0.006(0.013) -0.013(0.013) -0.020(0.018) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) 0.003(0.011) -0.038(0.015) -0.041(0.019) 
     
     
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. From year dummies specification, comparable to lower panel of Table 
3. 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
  
Dependent Variable:  
Log(Regional Median Real Weekly Wage) 
 
 (1) (2) (2)-(1) 
  
1986-2002 
 
2003-2012 
Change Between 
1986-2002 and 
2003-2012 
 
A. Wage Dynamics - Instrumented 
 
   
Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.005 (0.011) -0.069 (0.036) -0.064 (0.038) 
Log(Real Wage[t-1]) 0.646 (0.102) 0.616 (0.117) -0.030 (0.155) 
    
Region Dummies Yes Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.995 0.995  
Sample Size 176 110  
    
B. GDP Deflator 
 
   
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.007 (0.010) -0.015 (0.103) -0.008 (0.016) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1]) -0.004 (0.010) -0.054 (0.013) -0.050 (0.016) 
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.993 0.993  
Sample Size 187 110  
    
C. Exclude London    
    
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.017 (0.010) -0.013 (0.014) 0.004 (0.017) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1]) -0.020 (0.009) -0.060 (0.013) -0.040 (0.016) 
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.979 0.979  
Sample Size 170 100  
    
D. Regional Wage and Employment 
 
   
∆Log(Employment Rate[t]) -0.022 0.362 0.384 
 (0.080) (0.093) (0.122) 
Log(Employment Rate[t-1]) -0.118 0.541 0.659 
 (0.086) (0.118) (0.144) 
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.992 0.994  
Sample Size 187 110  
    
    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies regional specification comparable to lower panel of 
Table 3 in all panels. Instruments used in panel A are first and second lags of wages and unemployment. 
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Table 6: Exploration of Possible Reasons for Increased Unemployment Sensitivity 
 (1) (2) (2)-(1) 
  
1986-2002 
 
2003-2012 
Change Between 
1986-2002 and 
2003-2012 
 
A. Hourly Wages - Dependent Variable: Log(Regional 
Median Real Hourly Wage) 
 
   
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) 0.010 (0.009) -0.011 (0.012) -0.021 (0.015) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1]) 0.012 (0.010) -0.050 (0.012) -0.062 (0.016) 
    
Region Dummies Yes Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.994 0.995  
Sample Size 187 110  
    
B. Basic Weekly Pay - Dependent Variable: Log(Regional 
Median Real Weekly Wage Excluding Overtime Pay and 
Bonuses) 
 
   
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) 0.007 (0.009) -0.011 (0.013) -0.009 (0.012) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1]) 0.011 (0.009) -0.043 (0.017) -0.049 (0.015) 
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.994 0.996 0.996 
Sample Size 187 88 88 
    
C. Include Migration Control     
    
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.007 (0.010) -0.011 (0.013) -0.003 (0.016) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1]) -0.004 (0.010) -0.050 (0.013) -0.046 (0.016) 
Proportion UK Citizens -0.069 (0.161) -0.220 (0.170) -0.151 (0.233) 
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  
Year Dummies Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.992 0.994  
Sample Size 187 110  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies regional specification comparable to lower panel of 
Table 3 in all panels. Basic Weekly Pay changed definition in 2004 so the dependent variables in the first two 
columns of panel B and years 2003 and 2004 are excluded. The last column in panel B therefore reports the change 
for the period 2005 to 2012. 
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Table 7: Variations by Collective Bargaining Coverage 
  
Sample Split Based on Coverage of National Collective Agreements (1986-
2004) or National Collective Agreements or National Company Pay 
Structures (2005-2012) 
 
 1986-2004 2005-2012 
 Covered Uncovered Covered Uncovered 
     
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) 0.009 (0.015) 0.001 (0.018) 0.016 (0.017) -0.030 (0.020) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1]) 0.024 (0.016) -0.021 (0.016) -0.006 (0.015) -0.075 (0.024) 
     
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.973 0.984 0.991 0.994 
Sample Size 209 209 88 88 
     
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies regional specification comparable to lower panel of 
Table 3. 
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Appendix – Additional Tables 
 
Table A1: Time Dummies and Aggregate Unemployment, 1986-2012 
  
Dependent Variable:  
Averaged Time Dummies From Regional Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) – (3) 
  
1986-2012 
 
1986-2012 
 
1986-2002 
 
2003-2012 
Change Between  
1986-2002 and 
2003-2012 
      
∆Log(Unemployment Rate[t]) -0.047 0.055 0.017 0.067 0.051 
 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.061) (0.069) 
Log(Unemployment Rate[t-1]) -0.166 -0.056 -0.049 -0.088 -0.038 
 
(0.035) (0.024) (0.023) (0.092) (0.088) 
Trend -0.003 0.006 0.005 -0.004 -0.008 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Post-2002 Trend  -0.018    
 
 (0.004)    
      
 0.596 0.828 0.818 0.733  
R-Squared 27 27 17 10  
Sample Size      
 
     
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the values of the retrieved year dummies 
from Panel B in Table 3. 
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Table A2: The Impact of Using Different Price Deflators - Trend Specification 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Log(Regional Median Real Weekly Wage) 
 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1) 
 1988-2002 2003-2012 
Change Between 
1988-2002 and  
2003-2012 
A. CPI    
    
∆Log(Unemployment Rate [t] ) 0.005 -0.012 -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1] ) -0.077 -0.124 -0.047 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.021) 
Trend 0.007 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.985 0.970  
Sample Size 165 110  
    
B. GDP Deflator    
    
∆Log(Unemployment Rate [t] ) -0.011 0.004 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1] ) -0.021 -0.079 -0.058 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) 
Trend 0.010 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.993 0.986  
Sample Size 165 110  
    
C. RPI    
    
∆Log(Unemployment Rate [t] ) 0.002 0.011 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) 
Log(Unemployment Rate [t-1] ) -0.046 -0.121 -0.075 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) 
Trend 0.005 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Region Dummies  Yes Yes  
Regional Controls Yes Yes  
R-Squared 0.989 0.970  
Sample Size 165 110  
    
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. The time varying regional controls are from the Labour Force Survey 
and are the proportion with a degree, female, young and white. From trend specification, comparable to median 
model in panel A of Table 3. 
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Data Appendix – For Online Publication 
 
A. New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
 
We use employer reported wages data from the New Earnings Survey/Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings (NES/ASHE). This is an approximately 1 percent sample of all workers based on 
the last two digits of their National Insurance number. The data is drawn from firms’ 
administrative pay records on a common reporting basis and represents the most accurate UK 
wage data. From 1979 to 2003, this was called the New Earnings Survey (NES) and from 2004 
onwards the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).  
 
More specifically, the employer reported wages dataset used for the analysis is a panel of 
individuals extracted from NES/ASHE called New Earnings Survey Panel Data (NESPD)/ 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings Panel Data (ASHEPD). The NESPD/ASHEPD panel 
contains a reduced set of variables from NES/ASHE for years 1979 to 2012.  
 
We extracted gross weekly wages and hourly wages for all workers aged 16 to 65. These were 
computed at national and regional level (see B. below) at the 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th, 
80th and 90th percentiles). Most of our analysis focusses on the median. 
 
There are some discontinuities in the gross weekly wage series due to changes in the pay 
definitions and in the sample selection from NES to ASHE and other data issues we encountered: 
 
i) Earnings Definitions Across Time 
 
A new questionnaire introduced for the 2005 ASHE generates a discontinuity in the gross weekly 
earnings series used for most of our analysis. Gross weekly earnings include basic pay, bonuses 
(incentive pay and premium pay), overtime payments and other pay. With the introduction of the 
new questionnaire there were changes to the survey on questions related to incentive pay and 
other payments.   
 
NES has two different questions on incentive pay and bonuses (“payments made in every pay 
period” and “payments made less often than every pay period”) whereas ASHE from 2005 
onwards simplifies those two questions to only collect “incentive pay paid and earned in the pay 
period”. Comparing responses for years 2004 and 2005, ONS concludes that the NES question 
“where payments are made in every period” is comparable to responses to the 2005 question. 
Therefore, such a change in definition lowers incentive payments reported and, consequently, 
gross weekly pay. According to ONS, removing  “less often incentive pay” in 2004 decreases pay 
at an aggregate level by 1 percent. In 2003, 6.7 percent of the16 to 65 year-old employees in NES 
report having received incentive payments outside of the period with a median pay of £27.73 a 
week. 
 
NES does not contain a specific question on other payments as the respondents were asked to 
include other payments together with basic pay. From 2005 onwards, however, ASHE includes an 
extra question on “pay for other reasons” and excludes the reference to other payments from the 
basic pay question. By comparing the responses of a restricted sample of individuals to both 
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questionnaires, ONS concludes that half of the respondents included other pay together with basic 
pay in 2004 and split basic pay into basic pay and other pay in 2005. However, the other half of 
the respondents reported other pay in 2005 that they missed in 2004. The extra question in ASHE 
increases overall gross weekly pay by 1 percent in aggregate levels and thus offsets the effect of 
the incentive pay question and should not be a worry when calculating aggregate figures.15 In 
2005, 19.5 percent of employees in our sample received other payments with a median value of 
£23.71 a week. 
 
The measure of basic pay we consider in panel B of Table 6 has been generated using NES and 
ASHE cross-sections because NESPD and ASHEPD do not contain a measure of basic pay. From 
1986 to 2003, basic pay includes other payments (NES definition) while from 2005 onwards other 
payments are excluded (ASHE definition). 16 This small definitional shift is unlikely to affect the 
sensitivities to unemployment reported in Panel B of Table 6. 
 
ii) Changes in Sample Selection 
 
From 2004 onwards, ASHE includes employees who changed jobs or entered the job market 
between the sample selection date and the survey reference period. Although the wage series used 
for our analysis includes that supplementary sample of individuals, excluding them from year 
2004 to 2012 does not significantly change our results. In addition, ONS collected earning’s 
information on companies registered for VAT but not PAYE in 2004 and 2005 but stop collecting 
them in 2006 because the characteristics of the employees were similar to those registered in 
PAYE. These individuals are excluded from the NESPD/ASHEPD sample. 
 
In 2007 and 2008 the sample size was reduced by 20 percent and subsequently restored in 2009. 
The cut targeted the industries with the least variation in earning patterns so that the impact on 
aggregate figures should be small.  However, the reduction did not have a homogeneous effect 
across industries and, for instance, organisations that provided information electronically were not 
affected by the cut. The wage series released by ONS aimed at solving the potential non-
randomness of the cut by adjusting the weights. Given that we do not use weights for our analysis 
we have imputed the wage change from ONS published data series for regional weekly wages 
from 2007 to 2012 as a robustness check and the results remain consistent with the main results 
reported in Table 3.17  
 
Finally, in 2010, a new PAYE system was introduced leading to an ASHE sample 35 percent 
higher than expected. Previous system represented employers' accounts and the new system 
PAYE represents pay and tax details of individuals. According to the ONS, quality-assurance 
demonstrated that the final dataset of responses were similarly distributed across age, sex, 
industry and business size-band. 
 
iii) Earnings Under the National Insurance Lower Earning Limit 
 
                                                          
15
 ONS (2005). 
16
 Although the questionnaire was introduced in 2005, the wage measures included in the panel for year 2004 aim at 
replicating the “2005 onwards” measure of gross weekly wages (i.e. other pay was imputed and incentive “payments 
made less often than every pay period” excluded) so that we have excluded year 2004 from the basic pay analysis. 
17
 Our wage series excludes weighting so our wage estimates are slightly lower than those published by the ONS for 
recent years. The ONS data is unweighted from 1979 to 1996 but weights were developed from 1997. Weights are 
based on LFS estimates and were introduced with ASHE although back figures were generated from 1997. 
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Although there should not be any individual earning less than the National Insurance lower 
earnings limit (LEL), there is an increasing number of individuals in the panel earning below that 
quantity, from 4 percent in 1979 to 7 percent in 2012. The increase in the proportion of part-time 
workers explains such an increase as they account for virtually all of the individuals earning 
under LEL and the proportion of part-time workers in the panel increases from 14 percent in 1979 
to 28 percent in 2012. Hence the rise of workers with wages below the NI LEL was proportionate 
to the overall rise in part-time working suggesting no shift in the propensity of low waged 
workers to be in the sample. 
 
iv) Duplicates in Panel  
 
Both NES and ASHE questionnaires record the information for the main and secondary job of an 
individual. The general rule applied to generate the NESPD/ASHEPD panel is to keep just one 
job for each individual. However, from year 2001, more than one job for some individuals 
appears in the panel. These duplicates correspond to jobs coded as non-main jobs that have a 
higher pay than the main jobs. In order to generate a panel with one observation per person we 
have kept the higher paid job for those individuals that appear to have more than one job in the 
panel. The highest proportion of duplicates are observed in years 2001 to 2003 and they represent 
less than 0.3 percent of individuals. 
v) Collective Agreements 
The information on collective agreements in NESPD/ASHEPD differs across time. From 1986 to 
2004, respondents whose pay was set with reference to a pay agreement were classified into one 
of the major national collective agreements. From 1986 to 1996, 141 national agreements were 
reported and from 1997 to 2004 they were restricted to 44. From 2005 onwards, ONS simplified 
the types of agreements to 5: national agreement; sub-national agreement; organisational 
agreement; workplace agreement; and national or industry supplemented by a subnational, 
organisational or workplace agreement.  
In Table 7, an individual is defined as covered from year 1986 to 2004 if it is classified in one of 
the major national collective agreements; it is defined as uncovered otherwise. From 2005 
onwards, covered individuals are those that are classified as being in a national, sub-national, 
organisational or national or industry supplemented by a subnational, organisational or workplace 
agreement. Uncovered individuals from 2005 onwards also include those that report being in a 
workplace agreement. 
B. Price Indices 
Most of our analysis uses the Retail Price Index (RPI). We also compare with the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), the GDP price deflator and the newer revised RPI series (RPIJ) which uses the same 
basket of goods as in the RPI, but the methodology is more similar to the CPI. This is only 
available from 1998. The data are from ONS and more detail on their definitions and availability 
is given in Gooding (2011) and ONS (2012). 
 
C. Unemployment Rates 
National ILO unemployment rates were obtained from ONS. Regional ILO unemployment rates 
were calculated from Labour Force Survey (LFS) microdata. 
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D. Regional Panel 
The regional panel is put together for the old definition of the standard regions of Britain: : North 
East; North West; Yorkshire and Humberside; East Midlands; West Midlands; East Anglia; 
London; South East; South West; Wales; and Scotland.   This had to be done because this is the 
only definition in LFS going back as far as 1986 (the LFS variable URESMC), the start year of 
our statistical analysis. NES/ASHE data was configured using detailed area data to match. 
E. Labour Force Survey Variables 
The regional control variables were calculated from LFS microdata. For the main specifications 
these are the regional proportions of 16-65 year olds over time with a degree, female, young and 
white. In addition, for the panel C of Table 6 results the proportion of UK citizens was calculated 
from LFS microdata at the region-time level. 
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